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REDISCOVERING CORFIELD  V.  CORYELL
Gerard N. Magliocca*
“[T]he citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges [and] immunities of
citizens in the several States.”  Is the right which a citizen has to enjoy the common
property belonging to the citizens of the State a privilege or immunity? . . . I am




Justice Bushrod Washington’s 1825 circuit opinion in Corfield v. Coryell 2
is probably the most famous constitutional decision not issued by the
Supreme Court.3 Corfield is chiefly known for its enigmatic dicta on the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens secured against state denial by Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution.4  This dicta became a focal point for the
debate in the Thirty-Ninth Congress on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
© 2019 Gerard N. Magliocca.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Samuel R. Rosen Professor, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
Thanks to Elizabeth Monroe for her comments on an earlier draft.
1 This quote comes from Justice Washington’s notes on Corfield v. Coryell, which will
be described hereinafter as “Washington Notebook” (on file with author). See infra text
accompanying notes 9, 86–97, 111–15.
2 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230).  There is some
confusion about the proper way to cite Corfield.  Many cases and secondary sources use
1823 as the date, because the case was formally from the April 1823 Term of the circuit
court.  The final opinion, though, was not issued until 1825 (as the case report explains).
See id. at 550.  The most recent Supreme Court opinion citing Corfield gives 1825 as the
date. See McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 229 (2013).  I shall use 1825 in this Article.
3 See, e.g., Chester James Antieau, Paul’s Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12 (1967) (“[I]t would
be almost impossible to overestimate the importance of the [Corfield privileges-and-immu-
nities] quotation upon American law.”); David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v. Coryell and the
Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1485 (2005) (“Corfield
v. Coryell remains a famous, important, but largely unexamined constitutional case.”).
4 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52;
infra text accompanying note 58.
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Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5  Many com-
mentators contend that Corfield’s privileges-and-immunities passage should
be read as a guarantee of only equal access for out-of-state citizens to some
rights granted by state law.6  Others argue that Justice Washington was saying
that the Constitution secured certain fundamental rights to all national citi-
zens in spite of state law.7  Since Reconstruction, the latter point has been
made on behalf of unenumerated liberties including women’s suffrage (prior
to the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment), the right to travel
between the states, and the right to pursue a profession.8
This Article reveals new details about Corfield based on archival research.
In 2017, the author found Justice Washington’s original notes on Corfield in
the Chicago History Museum.9  The most important revelation about Corfield
is that the Justice was initially inclined to hold that the state law his decision
upheld was, in fact, unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”); Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982
(2012)) (guaranteeing some common-law rights to all Americans); KURT T. LASH, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 27
(2014) (“It is because Corfield plays such an important role in the debates over the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that it is important to take a
close look at the key section of Justice Washington’s opinion.”); infra text accompanying
notes 67–71; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 29 (1980) (stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s “framers repeatedly adverted to the Corfield discussion as the key
to what they were writing”).
6 See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1416 (1992); cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 821 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Justice Washington did not indicate
[in Corfield] whether Article IV, § 2, required States to recognize these fundamental rights in
their own citizens and thus in sojourning citizens alike, or whether the Clause simply pro-
hibited the States from discriminating against sojourning citizens with respect to whatever
fundamental rights state law happened to recognize.”).
7 See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939) (opinion of
Roberts, J.) (“At one time it was thought that [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] rec-
ognized a group of rights which, according to the jurisprudence of the day, were classed as
‘natural rights’; and that the purpose of the section was to create rights of citizens of the
United States by guaranteeing the citizens of every State the recognition of this group of
rights by every other State.  Such was the view of Justice Washington [in Corfield].”).
8 See A.G. Riddle, Speech in Support of the Woodhull Memorial, Before the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives, in 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 448, 453
(Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., Rochester, N.Y., Charles Mann Printing Co. 1881); see
also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 80 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Corfield
in support of the “right to travel or migrate interstate”); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 97 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (citing Corfield to support “the right to pur-
sue a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as equally
affects all persons”).
9 See Washington Notebook, supra note 1.  The notes are in a journal held by the
Chicago Historical Society, whose collection is housed in the Chicago History Museum.
Part II describes some of the journal’s contents. See infra text accompanying notes 86–92.
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Clause.10  The notes also say that he saw Livingston v. Van Ingen11 as the lead-
ing precedent on the Privileges and Immunities Clause and backed Chancel-
lor Kent’s view in that case that the Clause articulated a nondiscrimination
rule for out-of-state citizens instead of a freestanding guarantee of fundamen-
tal rights.12  Even more important may be the disclosure from the notes that
Justice Washington wrestled with the Commerce Clause issue in Corfield prior
to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden13 in a way that probably
influenced Chief Justice John Marshall’s landmark opinion for the Court.14
In short, the Corfield notes provide a fascinating glimpse into the thinking of
a key member of the Marshall Court at a crucial stage.
The discovery of Justice Washington’s notes also provides an occasion to
offer one reflection on Corfield’s legacy.  His opinion was the first notable
legal authority to say that the right to vote is fundamental.15  This idea was so
radical in the nineteenth century that even the strongest supporters of
Reconstruction shied away from Corfield’s implications for African American
and female voting.16  Indeed, not until the 1960s did the Supreme Court and
Congress accept Corfield’s wisdom that “the elective franchise, as regulated
and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be
exercised,” is an essential right of citizenship,17 though the United States still
struggles to reconcile that right with the reality of state and local regulation
of election administration.18
Part I gives a detailed account of Corfield and explores how the case was
subsequently understood.  Part II examines Justice Washington’s notes on
10 See supra text accompanying note 1; infra text accompanying note 114.
11 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812).
12 See Washington Notebook, supra note 1; infra text accompanying notes 114–21; see
also Livingston, 9 Johns. at 577 (opinion of Kent, C.J.) (stating that Article IV “means only
that citizens of other states shall have equal rights with our own citizens, and not that they
shall have different or greater rights”).
13 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress
shall have power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”).
14 Corfield was almost certainly the first circuit case to apply Gibbons.  See Richard A.
Epstein, Rediscovering the Classical Liberal Constitution: A Reply to Professor Hovenkamp, 101
IOWA L. REV. 55, 69 (2015).
15 See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230).
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Woman Suffrage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1871,
at 1 (reprinting the Report of the House Judiciary Committee rejecting the argument that
Corfield supported women’s suffrage).
17 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964)
(“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society.  Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired man-
ner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”); see also Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 & 52 U.S.C.).
18 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating por-
tions of the Voting Rights Act).
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the case and shows how they expand our understanding of Gibbons and
Corfield.  Part III explores Corfield’s revolutionary reference to voting rights.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE OPINION
This Part explains Corfield and the way in which the case was cited after-
wards.  My narrative will go beyond the standard one by discussing the Com-
merce Clause issue and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the case.  In
part, that decision is motivated by Justice Washington’s ideas about the Com-
merce Clause in his notes, but another factor is that Corfield contains vital
clues about how Gibbons was decided in the Supreme Court.
A. The Factual and Procedural Background
Corfield is best understood as presenting a “tragedy-of-the-commons”
problem.19  In 1820, New Jersey enacted a statute restricting the harvesting of
oysters within state waters to prevent exhaustion of a natural resource.20  Oys-
ter harvesting was barred from May until September, and during the rest of
the year only state residents were allowed to take oysters from state waters.21
The plaintiff in Corfield, who was not a New Jersey resident, was the owner of
a vessel that conducted oyster harvesting in state waters and was manned by
crew who were also not state residents.22  The vessel and its contents were
seized by state authorities and auctioned off.23
Plaintiff brought a trespass action in federal court and made four consti-
tutional claims in alleging that his ship was wrongfully seized and sold.24
First, the state statute on oyster harvesting was “contrary to the second section
of the fourth article of the constitution of the United States, by denying to
the citizens of other states, rights and privileges enjoyed by those of New
Jersey.”25  Second, the state statute was “contrary to that part of the constitu-
tion which vests in congress the power to regulate trade and commerce
between the states.”26  Third, the statute violated “the second section of the
third article, which extends the judicial authority to all cases of admiralty and
19 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 1–23 (1990) (describing the
tragedy-of-the-commons problem and possible solutions).
20 See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 550.
21 Id.
22 See id.  There was a dispute over whether the oyster harvesting occurred in New
Jersey waters. See id. at 553. Corfield examined the royal charters setting the state’s bounda-
ries and some relevant colonial compacts before ruling that New Jersey did have jurisdic-
tion over plaintiff’s vessel. See id. at 553–55.  The court also rejected the argument that the
state proceeding was invalid for being held in the wrong county. See id. at 555.
23 See id. at 550.
24 Corfield ruled that plaintiff could not maintain a trespass action because the vessel
was operating under a charter at the time of seizure. See id. at 555.  Plaintiff’s “only remedy
is an action on the case for consequential damages,” though the point was moot once the
constitutionality of the New Jersey statute was upheld. See id.
25 See id. at 549.
26 Id.
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maritime jurisdiction.”27  Fourth, the state proceedings “were contrary to the
fourth article of the amendments to the constitution; the seizure having been
made without a warrant.”28
Corfield came before the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania and was heard by Justice Bushrod Washington.29  In this era, the
Supreme Court Justices were required to “ride circuit” and hold civil and
criminal trials in designated areas of the country.30  A trial was held and the
Justice, “after stating to the jury the great importance of many of the ques-
tions involved in this cause, recommended to them to find for the plaintiff,
and assess the damages.”31  Trial courts possessed more discretion to com-
ment on the evidence and influence a jury’s verdict in the nineteenth cen-
tury than they do now, and in Corfield the jury took the court’s advice and
found for plaintiff in the amount of $560.32
At this point, scholars familiar with the constitutional analysis in Corfield
might sit up and take notice.  Justice Washington’s opinion in the case held
for the defendant.33  Why, then, did he ask the jury to find for the plaintiff?
The official case report says only that the “case was argued, on the points of
law agreed by the counsel to arise on the facts, at the October term 1824, and
was taken under advisement until April term 1825, when the following opin-
ion was delivered.”34  In other words, well after the trial ended in the plain-
tiff’s favor, legal arguments were heard and resolved by the court in the
defendant’s favor.  There are two possible explanations for this about-face.
Either Justice Washington changed his mind, or some new case came down
that changed the correct result.
One possible answer is that Gibbons was decided in March 1824 and
required Justice Washington to consider new arguments on the Commerce
27 Id. The maritime claim was rejected on the ground that “the power to regulate the
fisheries belonging to the several states, and to punish those who should transgress those
regulations, was exclusively vested in the states, respectively, at the time when the present
constitution was adopted, and that it was not surrendered to the United States, by the mere
grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the judicial branch.” Id. at 553.  In other
words, an act of Congress was needed to create exclusive federal jurisdiction over the
state’s seizure of the vessel. See id.
28 Id. at 549.  The Fourth Amendment claim was apparently abandoned, as the court
never addressed the issue.  In the 1820s, there was no Supreme Court decision on whether
any portion of what we call the Bill of Rights applied to state governments. See Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243 (1833) (rejecting the incorporation of the first set of
amendments).
29 See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 546.  There is no indication that Judge Richard Peters, who
often sat with Justice Washington on the circuit court, participated in Corfield.
30 See generally Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of
Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753 (2003) (describing the evolution of that practice).
31 See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 549.
32 See id. at 550. See generally Rene´e Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American
Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195 (2000) (discussing the prevalence of
judicial commentary on evidence and the practice’s decline by the twentieth century).
33 See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 555.
34 Id. at 550.
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Clause issue in Corfield.35 Gibbons, of course, was the Supreme Court’s first
case discussing the Commerce Clause in detail and held that a New York
statute granting a monopoly for steamboat traffic in that state’s waters was
contrary to multiple acts of Congress.36  Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion
explained: “Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse.  It describes the commercial intercourse between nations . . . in
all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse.”37  Marshall added that the commerce power, “like all others
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.”38  Nevertheless, the Court wrote that there were many state
statutes with “a remote and considerable influence on commerce” that were
permissible.39  Examples included “[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health
laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce
of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c.”40  Justice
Washington joined the Court’s opinion in Gibbons knowing full well that
Corfield raised the question of whether a state statute restricting oyster har-
vesting in navigable waters came within the category of legislation that Gib-
bons said fell outside of the commerce power.41
B. The Commerce Clause Analysis
When the Justice gave his opinion in Corfield, he began the discussion of
the merits by asking whether the New Jersey oyster law “is repugnant to the
power granted to congress to regulate commerce.”42  Citing Gibbons, he
wrote that the commerce power “does by no means impair the right of the
state government to legislate upon all subjects of internal police within their
territorial limits . . . even although such legislation may indirectly and
remotely affect commerce.”43  Washington also quoted the Chief Justice’s
opinion almost verbatim in stating that “inspection, quarantine, and health
laws; laws regulating the internal commerce of the state; laws establishing and
35 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 186 (1824) (listing the date of decision
as March 2).
36 See id. at 239–40.  See generally Richard Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 567 (2017) (offering a comprehensive account of the decision).  Justice William
Johnson concurred in the result on the ground that the commerce power was vested exclu-
sively in Congress. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 227 (Johnson, J., concurring).
37 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189–90.
38 Id. at 196.
39 Id. at 203.
40 Id.
41 We know that Justice Story saw a draft opinion of Corfield while the Supreme Court
was in session, as Washington said as much in a letter written after Corfield was decided. See
Letter from Bushrod Washington to Joseph Story (June 8, 1825) (on file with author) (“I
send you the report of the case of Corfield v. Coryell as you perused the opinion at large
during the last session of the Supreme Court.”).
42 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 550 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230).
43 Id.
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regulating turnpike roads, ferries, canals, and the like” were instances of valid
state legislation.44  The Justice then made his main point, which was that
if the power which congress possesses to regulate commerce does not inter-
fere with that of the state to regulate its internal trade, although the latter
may remotely affect external commerce, . . . much less can that power impair
the right of the state governments to legislate, in such manner as in their
wisdom may seem best, over the public property of the state.45
He noted that the state law imposed no restrictions on the use of state waters
“for purposes of navigation and commercial intercourse” nor the “slightest
restraint imposed upon any to buy and sell, or in any manner to trade within
the limits of the state.”46
Corfield next addressed whether the fact that oysters were articles of com-
merce meant that a state law regulating their harvest by out-of-state citizens
came within Congress’s commerce power.47  Washington rejected this rea-
soning because “[t]he law does not inhibit the buying and selling of oysters
after they are lawfully gathered, and have become articles of trade; but it
forbids the removal of them from the beds in which they grow, (in which
situation they cannot be considered articles of trade[ ]).”48  The Justice
based his distinction between potential and actual articles of trade on a state-
ment in Gibbons that said state inspection laws were not commercial regula-
tions because “[t]hey act upon the subject before it becomes an article of
foreign commerce, or of commerce among the states, and prepare it for that
purpose.”49  “Is this not,” Corfield asked, “precisely the nature of those laws
which prescribe the seasons when, and the manner in which, the taking of
oysters is permitted?”50  After all, “[p]aving stones, sand, and many other
things, are as clearly articles of trade as oysters; but can it be contended, that
the laws of a state, which treat as tort feasors those who shall take them away
without the permission of the owner of them, are commercial regulations?”51
Justice Washington concluded that “[w]e deem it superfluous to pursue this
subject further,”52 evidently because the notion that tort law could be part of
Congress’s commerce power (in spite of its indirect effect on commerce) was
viewed as preposterous.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 550–51.  On this score, Corfield observed that federal jurisdiction over the
nation’s navigable waters implied no cession of state property interests in those waters. See
id. at 551.
46 Id..
47 See id. (“It was insisted by the plaintiff’s counsel, that, as oysters constituted an arti-
cle of trade, a law which abridges the right of the citizens of other states to take them,
except in particular vessels, amounts to a regulation of the external commerce of the
state.”).
48 Id.
49 Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824)).
50 Id.
51 Id. This passage is notable because it closely tracks a statement in Justice Washing-
ton’s notes on Corfield. See infra text accompanying note 113.
52 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
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C. The Privileges and Immunities Clause Analysis
After disposing of the Commerce Clause issue, Corfield stated:
The next question is, whether this act infringes that section of the constitu-
tion which declares that “the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states?”  The inquiry is,
what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states?53
On this issue, there was no Supreme Court authority and nothing had
changed since the trial in Corfield.  Justice Washington held:
[W]e cannot accede to the proposition which was insisted on by the counsel,
that, under this provision of the constitution, the citizens of the several states
are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the
citizens of any other particular state, merely upon the ground that they are
enjoyed by those citizens . . . .54
Furthermore, the Justice rejected the view that “in regulating the use of the
common property of the citizens of such state, the legislature is bound to
extend to the citizens of all the other states the same advantages as are
secured to their own citizens.”55  “[I]t would,” the court explained, “be going
quite too far to construe the grant of privileges and immunities of citizens, as
amounting to a grant of a co-tenancy in the common property of the state, to
the citizens of all the other states.”56  To do so “would, in many instances, be
productive of the most serious public inconvenience and injury, particularly,
in regard to those kinds of fish, which, by being exposed to too general use,
may be exhausted.”57
The portion of Corfield that became controversial, though, was the dicta
on privileges and immunities that preceded the holding.  Here is the passage
defining the privileges and immunities in the several states:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right,
to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.  What these
fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult
to enumerate.  They may, however, be all comprehended under the follow-
ing general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to
53 Id.
54 Id. at 552.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. The tragedy-of-the-commons problem in Corfield was then restated:
The oyster beds belonging to a state may be abundantly sufficient for the use of
the citizens of that state, but might be totally exhausted and destroyed if the legis-
lature could not so regulate the use of them as to exclude the citizens of the other
states from taking them, except under such limitations and restrictions as the laws
may prescribe.
Id.
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pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole.  The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any
other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or oth-
erwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher
taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be
mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens,
which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed
to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regu-
lated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to
be exercised.  These, and many others which might be mentioned, are,
strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by
the citizens of each state, in every other state, was manifestly calculated (to
use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the
old articles of confederation) “the better to secure and perpetuate mutual
friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states of the
Union.”58
As members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress quoted part or all of this passage in
the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, some comments about Corfield’s dicta are appropriate.59
The first observation about Justice Washington’s definition of privileges
and immunities is that he was speaking in aspirational terms.60  History does
not support the notion that the rights in Corfield had “at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.”  When the
Justice said that certain privileges “belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments,” he was setting a standard for evaluating whether a govern-
ment was free instead of describing a free government’s practices.  Indeed,
part of his statement closely corresponds to the ideal set forth in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights that all men possess certain basic rights; “namely, the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”61
A second point that is often made about Corfield is that Justice Washing-
ton drew his list of rights mainly from the common law rather than from the
58 Id. at 551–52; see also ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV, para. 1.
59 The critical exception was John Bingham, who drafted the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and never referred to Corfield during the Thirty-Ninth Congress. See GERARD N.
MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 117–18 (2013).
60 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 406 n.84 (2011) (“Washington’s statement
that these rights ‘have at all times been enjoyed’ must be taken as aspirational rather than
as an accurate account of history; the comity [or Privileges and Immunities] clause was
necessary precisely because states had not always respected these rights and might not in
the future.”).
61 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. I; see RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN
CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 107 (2016).
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Constitution.62  The right of citizens to travel, to dispose of property, to bring
civil actions, and to seek the writ of habeas corpus were well settled at com-
mon law.63  While some of these rights can be inferred from the Constitu-
tion, Corfield does not suggest that the 1787 text was the source of rights that
belonged to citizens of all free governments and dated back to indepen-
dence.  The exception to Washington’s common-law approach was the right
to vote, which was not then classified as a right of citizenship in the United
States.64
The final (and most important) insight is that Corfield’s dicta did not
make clear whether states were required by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause to give certain fundamental rights to all citizens or just give out-of-
state citizens any such rights granted by state law.  One take on the opinion is
that the rights Justice Washington listed as fundamental were recognized in
every state.  Under this reading, Corfield was saying only that these well-estab-
lished rights could not be denied to out-of-state citizens.  Another reading,
though, is that the opinion’s list of fundamental rights must be given by all
states to all of their citizens because they were privileges and immunities of
national citizenship.  To some extent, the confusion results from the lack of
citations in Corfield’s famous passage.  Moreover, dicta is frequently ambigu-
ous precisely because the discussion is not necessary to decide a case and is
not given the same level of scrutiny as a holding.  This raises yet another
question about Justice Washington’s opinion: Why did he include this list of
rights in Corfield at all?
D. Corfield in the Thirty-Ninth Congress and Beyond
Prior to 1866, courts read Corfield as supporting a nondiscrimination
rule against out-of-state citizens,65 but in the Thirty-Ninth Congress several
Republicans cited Corfield’s privileges-and-immunities dicta as guidance for
how fundamental rights should be understood for the freed slaves.66  For
instance, during the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois quoted Corfield and said that the opinion “enumerates
the very rights belonging to a citizen of the United States which are set forth
in the first section of this bill.”67  Likewise, Representative James Wilson of
Iowa quoted from Corfield to support the proposition that the Civil Rights Act
62 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 177
(1998) (“Washington seemed to be following a quintessentially common-law approach in
deducing ‘fundamental’ rights.”).
63 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–42 (discussing these basic liberties
of English subjects). The right against unequal taxation is more complex, though there
was precedent concluding that this was a privilege and immunity of citizenship. See Camp-
bell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797); Upham, supra note 3, at 1499–1502.
64 See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 1–52 (2000).
65 See LASH, supra note 5, at 29–37.
66 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 60, at 196–97, 208–09.
67 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see
also id. at 1835–36 (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
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“merely affirms existing law” on the rights of citizens notwithstanding state
law.68  Some critics replied that Justice Washington’s “views were uttered in
reference alone to white citizens” and hence did not authorize the Act.69
When the discussion turned to the Fourteenth Amendment, other mem-
bers of Congress looked to Corfield as inspiration for the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause.  Most notably, Senator Jacob Howard’s introduction of the
proposed amendment quoted at length from “what that very learned and
excellent judge” said about the privileges and immunities of citizens in
describing what the equivalent provision in Section 1 meant.70  Likewise,
when Congress tried to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
against the Ku Klux Klan, Republicans continued to cite Corfield as a pillar of
citizenship.  For example, Senator Arthur Boreman quoted the dicta and told
his colleagues: “The rights, immunities, and privileges described by Judge
Washington have, in numerous instances . . . been invaded and trampled
upon and outraged.”71
When the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases in 1873,
though, the Corfield dicta was quoted only in part and was given a more lim-
ited construction.72  The Court omitted the specific rights contained in Jus-
tice Washington’s list and stated that the sole purpose of Article IV’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause
was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as you grant
or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose
restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the
measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.73
Put another way, Slaughter-House gave Corfield its antebellum reading as an
antidiscrimination case instead of a decision about fundamental rights
secured against states.74  Justice Field’s dissent rejected this view, included
68 See id. at 1117–18 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
69 See id. at 1269 (statement of Rep. Kerr).
70 See id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard).  Senator Howard’s speech is discussed in
two companion articles and a reply in this issue of the Notre Dame Law Review that discuss
the best reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Compare Randy E. Barnett & Evan
D. Bernick, The Privileges or Immunities Clause, Abridged: A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Four-
teenth Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 499–502, 551–54 (2019) (relying in part on
Howard’s speech to argue against an enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause), and Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Difference Narrows: A Reply to
Kurt Lash, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 679, 690–92 (2019), with Kurt T. Lash, The Enumerated-
Rights Reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause: A Response to Barnett and Bernick, 95 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 591, 650–57 (2019) (contesting the significance of Howard’s remarks).
71 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 228 (1871) (statement of Sen. Boreman);
see id. at 69 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
72 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75–76 (1873).
73 Id. at 77; see id. at 76.
74 Nonetheless, the Court said that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment protected “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,” which was one of
the rights listed in Corfield. See id. at 79; Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1825) (No. 3230).  I need not address that point in this Article.
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most of the specific rights that Corfield described, and said that Justice Wash-
ington was describing privileges and immunities that by “right belong to the
citizens of all free governments.”75  Similarly, Justice Bradley’s dissent gave
Corfield’s dicta the broad reading supported by the Thirty-Ninth Congress as
part of an analysis that gave the Fourteenth Amendment a more generous
interpretation.76
In sum, Corfield is a fascinating constitutional opinion with weighty impli-
cations for construing the Fourteenth Amendment.  Let us now go on an
archaeological expedition and see what Justice Washington’s case notes
reveal about his thinking in the case.
II. JUSTICE WASHINGTON’S WORK PRODUCT
This Part describes the journal that contains Justice Washington’s notes
on Corfield and examines what the journal can tell us about how he arrived at
his decision.  The first takeaway is that the Justice was already grappling with
the question resolved by Gibbons before that decision was made and that his
notes contain important clues about the reasoning that was ultimately used
in Gibbons.77  Next, Washington’s notes state that he was initially inclined to
hold the New Jersey law unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause because he thought that the right of citizens to use navigable
waters could not be distinguished from the right to harvest oysters in those
waters.78  For reasons unknown he changed his mind, but the Justice’s
doubts might explain why he felt compelled to spell out some of the constitu-
tional privileges and immunities of citizens.  Lastly, the notes indicate that
Washington saw a New York case upholding that state’s steamboat monopoly
as the leading authority on the Privileges and Immunities Clause and
endorsed that decision’s view that the Clause was about only equal treatment
of out-of-state citizens.79  This final point squares with the antebellum equal-
treatment reading of Corfield, rather than the fundamental-rights interpreta-
tion given during Reconstruction.
75 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
76 See id. at 117–18 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“It is pertinent to observe that both the
clause of the Constitution referred to, and Justice Washington in his comment on it, speak
of the privileges and immunities of citizens in a State; not of citizens of a State.  It is the
privileges and immunities of citizens, that is, of citizens as such, that are to be accorded to
citizens of other States when they are found in any State; or, as Justice Washington says,
‘privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right,
to the citizens of all free governments.’”).
77 See infra text accompanying notes 97–110.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 114–17.
79 See infra text accompanying notes 118–21; see also Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns.
507 (N.Y. 1812).
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A. The Provenance of the Journal
In October 2017, I discovered Justice Washington’s Corfield notes while
conducting research for his biography.80  Bushrod Washington was George
Washington’s nephew and inherited Mount Vernon and George Washing-
ton’s papers after Martha Washington’s death.81  He studied law with James
Wilson in Philadelphia and then served in Virginia’s ratifying convention for
the Constitution,82 where James Madison described him as “a young Gen-
tleman of talents” in a letter to Thomas Jefferson.83  After over a decade in
private practice, President John Adams appointed Washington to the
Supreme Court, where he remained until his death in 1829.84  Though over-
shadowed by his uncle and by his friend and colleague Chief Justice Mar-
shall,85 my research indicates that Washington is an underrated figure who
made significant contributions to the law beyond Corfield.
The Corfield notes are in a journal held by the Chicago History Museum,
which houses the collection of the Chicago Historical Society.86  The journal
contains fragments of Justice Washington’s letters, records on illnesses
among the slaves and family members at Mount Vernon, his work product on
other cases and subjects, and draft opinions.87  Perhaps the most important
of the Supreme Court draft opinions in the journal is Green v. Biddle,88 in
which Justice Washington invalidated a Kentucky debt-relief statute and
essentially rewrote Justice Joseph Story’s prior opinion for the Court because
Story’s opinion was considered too hostile to states’ rights.89  The precise
date range of the journal is hard to ascertain, but one of the circuit court
80 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, WASHINGTON’S HEIR: THE LIFE OF JUSTICE BUSHROD
WASHINGTON (forthcoming).
81 See RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 803 (2010).
82 See SCOTT E. CASPER, SARAH JOHNSON’S MOUNT VERNON: THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF
AN AMERICAN SHRINE 10 (2008).
83 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 22, 1788) (providing an over-
view of the convention delegates), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 120, 121 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1904).
84 The best law review article on Justice Washington’s career is Herbert A. Johnson,
Bushrod Washington, 62 VAND. L. REV. 447 (2009).
85 See, e.g., JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 290 (1996)
(describing Marshall and Washington’s professional and personal relationship).
86 General information about the Chicago History Museum can be found at www
.chicagohistory.org.
87 My characterization of the journal is based on my personal review of the document
along with photos that I took with the permission of the Chicago History Museum that are
on file with the author.
88 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
89 See Johnson, supra note 84, at 473–75.  In the draft opinion, Justice Washington
closed by using the singular to describe his conclusion: “I hold myself answerable to God,
my conscience and my country to decide the question according to the dictates of my best
judgment, be the consequences of the decision what they may.” See Washington Notebook,
supra note 1.  In the final opinion, he used the plural: “[W]e hold ourselves answerable to
God, our consciences, and our country, to decide this question according to the dictates of
our best judgment, be the consequences of the decision what they may.” Biddle, 21 U.S. (8
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opinions is from 1820,90 and there are notes on the Justice’s thinking on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ogden v. Saunders,91 which was announced in
1827.92
The journal’s authenticity is not in doubt.  Acquired by the Chicago His-
torical Society in 1920, the journal came from the estate of Charles Gunther,
a candy magnate and political memorabilia collector, who gave the society
many items, such as the table upon which Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee
signed the surrender ending the Civil War.93  Furthermore, there is no rea-
son to think that anyone prior to 1920 would have forged a Bushrod Wash-
ington journal.  First, the journal contains esoteric material of interest only to
scholars, though as far as I can determine no scholar took notice of those
contents until now.94  Second, the journal has a rough quality (with many
cross-outs and marginal notes) that is inconsistent with a forgery.95  Third,
Justice Washington was not a well-known figure such that there would have
been a lucrative market for fakes of his work.96  Finally, the journal does not
change constitutional law in any way, which could have been the motive of a
dedicated forger.
B. The Contents of the Journal—The Commerce Clause
Proceeding on the assumption that the journal is real, we can turn to
what the Corfield notes say.  The relevant section begins with the heading
“Corfield v. Coryell” and then states the following:
Governor Wolcott’s reasons ag[ainst] the Connecticut Bill[:] The Constitu-
tion of the U.S. vests in Cong[ress] the right to regulate commerce between
the States[.]  This right is necessarily exclusive.  If then N.Y. can constitution-
ally forbid the navigation of her waters for commercial or other purposes, by
steam boats, she may equally forbid it to all vessels of any description.  This
power to regulate includes a right to make regulations regarding the use of
Wheat.) at 93.  This distinction tells us something about how drafts were prepared in the
Marshall Court and modified as Justices joined the opinions.
90 See Le Tigre, 15 F. Cas. 404 (C.C.D.N.J. 1820) (No. 8281); Washington Notebook,
supra note 1.  The notes may have been kept to help the Justice create published reports
on his cases, for at this time there was no independent service that did that work for circuit
courts.
91 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Washington Notebook, supra note 1.
92 See Ogden, 25 U.S.(12 Wheat.) at 254–270 (opinion of Washington, J.).
93 The information about Gunther and his items that are now in the Chicago History
Museum comes from the Museum exhibits and from an email by Leslie Martin, a reference
librarian at the Museum, dated September 12, 2018 (on file with author).
94 I have been unable to find any references to the journal by any published work,
though there could be an unpublished dissertation that cites the contents.
95 A clever forger could have foreseen that writing in this fashion would more readily
fool people, but that probably overstates how clever forgers are and begs the question of
why such an elaborate deception would be undertaken.
96 I am no handwriting expert, but I can say that the script in the journal looks the
same as the handwriting in other letters and documents that I have examined that were
clearly drafted by Justice Washington.
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navigable waters[,] not the objects of commerce [that] may be attained.  A
state may make regulations respecting ferries, bridges, etc. and take tolls for
the use of them for this is in furtherance of the power vested in Congress.
The grant by a State of the exclusive right to use them does not interfere
with the right vested in Cong[ress].  But the exclusive right to the use of
navigable waters for all purposes does.  By this grant to Cong[ress] the navi-
gable waters of the U.S. are thrown open to all its citizens for navigation
[and] commerce [and] no State can prohibit the use of them to any citizen.
The N.Y. law equally interferes with the collection of the revenue by imports
etc.
As Congress has passed laws regulating the commercial intercourse
between the States, as these are bottomed upon the principle that such inter-
course may be carried on without interruption by all the citizens of the U.S.
The above law would be void even tho[ugh] the power was concurrent.97
To unpack this passage, the starting point is that Justice Washington was
reflecting on the Commerce Clause issue in Corfield.  The most logical view is
that these notes predate Gibbons, as there is no reference to that decision
anywhere in the notes or anywhere else in the journal.  Instead of relying on
Gibbons, Washington cited for himself a veto that Governor Oliver Wolcott Jr.
of Connecticut issued in May 1822 against a bill that barred steamboat navi-
gation in state waters by anyone licensed to operate steamboats in New
York.98  The bill was designed to retaliate for a New York law that granted a
steamboat monopoly in that state’s waters to Robert Fulton and Robert Liv-
ingston.99  (The New York statute was the one later invalidated by Gib-
bons.)100  Wolcott’s veto is an obscure text that has not been subjected to a
detailed examination until now.101
97 Washington Notebook, supra note 1.
98 Governor Wolcott’s entire veto message can be found in the Columbian Register (New
Haven) of June 1, 1822 [hereinafter Wolcott Veto] (on file with author).  The veto was
promptly overridden. See id.; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 4 (1824)
(argument of Daniel Webster) (mentioning the Connecticut Act); cf. Primus, supra note
36, at 611 (discussing the statute that was enacted).  Wolcott’s father signed the Declara-
tion of Independence, while Wolcott himself was Alexander Hamilton’s principal deputy
in the Treasury Department before serving as Treasury Secretary for George Washington
and John Adams. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 292, 479, 620 (2004).
99 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1; Wolcott Veto, supra note 987 (“The Bill is pro- R
fessedly retaliatory . . . .  The object of this Bill is, not to create a right in our citizens to the
use of the waters of New-York, but to prohibit the use of our waters, until that right is
surrendered to us.”).
100 Shortly I will explain that the same New York statute was upheld in state court by
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812), which was the precedent on the Privileges
and Immunities Clause that Justice Washington carefully considered in his Corfield notes.
See infra text accompanying notes 114–21.
101 I do not know what drew Justice Washington’s attention to Governor Wolcott’s veto,
though my research does show that the Justice corresponded with Wolcott when the latter
was the Secretary of the Treasury. See Letter from Bushrod Washington to Oliver Wolcott,
Jr. (Nov. 1, 1800) (on file with author).
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Wolcott argued that New York lacked the authority to pass its steamboat
law under the Commerce Clause (standing on its own or as applied by Con-
gress in various statutes) and thus Connecticut lacked the authority to
respond in kind.102  The only proper remedy, he wrote, lay in a constitu-
tional challenge to the New York law in the U.S. Supreme Court.103  A com-
parison of the Corfield notes and Wolcott’s veto shows that Justice Washington
was quoting or summarizing the veto.  Accordingly, one inference that can be
drawn from this part of the notes is that Governor Wolcott’s veto of the Con-
necticut bill influenced the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gibbons through Jus-
tice Washington.  Almost nothing is known about how Gibbons was decided,
but the notes tell us that one Justice was thinking deeply about the constitu-
tional issue presented by Gibbons before the Court heard that case.
There are two important similarities between the main source that Jus-
tice Washington consulted—Governor Wolcott’s veto—and Chief Justice
Marshall’s subsequent opinion.  First, Wolcott repeatedly used the word
“intercourse” to define or describe commerce (as Washington jotted down
twice in his notes).104  This sweeping characterization of commerce was, of
course, a cornerstone of the Commerce Clause dicta in Gibbons.105  Second,
Governor Wolcott made a point (also noted by Washington) that stated the
holding in Gibbons, which was that a state steamboat monopoly was invalid on
preemption grounds even if Congress lacked the exclusive authority to regu-
late commerce.106  These commonalities could be a coincidence, but the fact
that Justice Washington noted these aspects of Wolcott’s veto prior to Gibbons
suggests that they are not.
In this respect, the Corfield notes indicate that the Marshall Court should
probably be understood as a group effort not unlike the Warren Court.107
102 See Wolcott Veto, supra note 98 (“If our citizens are unlawfully excluded from the
waters of the State of New-York, by the operation of their acts, it creates no right in us to
deprive their citizens of the use of our waters . . . .”).  Wolcott discussed the Commerce
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in his veto, but Justice Washington took
notes on only the Commerce Clause discussion.
103 See id. (“I cannot believe that our National Constitution is so defective, that the
questions cannot be fairly and speedily presented, or that the enlightened tribunal created
to decide them, either has refused or would refuse, or delay a decision, upon a case regu-
larly presented for their adjudication.”).
104 See id. (“[I]t may be assumed as an axiom, that all regulations by the states, which
relate either to ferries, bridges, or roads, or other public improvements, which facilitate
the intercourse between different parts of our Country, are clearly constitutional . . . .”); id.
(referring to “free and unconstrained commercial intercourse”); see also supra text accom-
panying note 95.
105 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1824).
106 See id. at 96; Wolcott Veto, supra note 98 (“[I]f it were admitted, that the powers are
concurrent, it may be observed, that Congress have already passed numerous acts relating to
the commercial intercourse between the different States, all of which are necessarily
founded on the admitted principle, that such intercourse may be carried on freely and
without interruption, by all the citizens of the United States.”); supra text accompanying note 97.
107 Scholars of the Warren Court understand that Chief Justice Warren relied on Jus-
tice William Brennan or Justice Hugo Black in thinking through some of the great opin-
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The Marshall Court is often depicted as the achievement of one
superhero,108 in part because Marshall is the named author of most of that
Court’s opinions and because there is hardly any evidence about how those
opinions were written.109  The reality is that the unanimity of the Marshall
Court probably reflected the hard work by the Justices to reach a consensus
and bring their particular skills to the problems that they confronted.110  In
Gibbons, we see a sign that Justice Washington provided assistance to the
Chief Justice, even if that meant only referring him to a helpful analysis.
* * *
In the next part of the Corfield notes, Justice Washington tried to reason
from the Wolcott Veto to the New Jersey law on oyster harvesting. He wrote
the following to himself:
[D]oes the article of the Constitution above mentioned apply to this case[?]
The law merely forbids the taking of oysters.  Cannot a law be made to pre-
vent citizens of other states from taking sand, stones, wood or anything
belonging to individuals, to the state, or to the citizens of N.J. in common?
What has that to do with commerce, which consists in bartering, buying
[and] selling[?]  The prohibition is not of the use of the waters for naviga-
tion [and] trade, but of the taking of oysters within the waters.  Could not a
law forbid the citizens of other states from taking the fish or oysters from a
several fishery?  Or from a free fishery?  If she could why not forbid the same
act in relation to a common fishery?111
One point about this passage is that the Justice was unsympathetic to the
claim that the New Jersey statute violated the Commerce Clause.  Thus, his
ions that bear his name. See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL
CHAMPION 237–38 (2010) (discussing Justice Brennan’s role in the editing of Chief Justice
Warren’s opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); see also JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE
FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 348–49 (2006) (summarizing the Chief
Justice’s relationships with Justice Black and Justice Brennan).
108 See, e.g., CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
RULE OF LAW 212 (1996) (“More than anyone else, John Marshall invented American con-
stitutional law . . . .”).
109 One obvious reason for this lack of evidence is that during the Marshall Court the
Justices lived together when the Court was in session. See SMITH, supra note 85, at 377–78.
As a result, virtually all of their deliberations were oral rather than written.
110 In my biography of Justice Washington, I plan to explore at least one other instance
in which circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that he made a substantial con-
tribution to an opinion written by someone else. See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
43 (1815) (invalidating a Virginia statute that divested the Episcopal Church of its property
in an opinion by Justice Story that closely tracked the reasoning given by Justice Washing-
ton about the same statute when he was in private practice).
111 Washington Notebook, supra note 1.  After this paragraph, the notes summarize
some cases (including a few from England) that may have been discussed by counsel. See
id. The fact that Justice Washington was concentrating on a case challenging a state law
that indirectly regulated commerce may have also had an impact on Gibbons insofar as the
Court made clear that many comparable state statutes were valid. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1824).  There is, though, no proof of that connection.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL204.txt unknown Seq: 18  7-JAN-20 14:46
718 notre dame law review [vol. 95:2
change of heart from the trial in Corfield, where he asked the jury to rule for
the plaintiff, and his opinion ruling for the defendant, probably cannot be
attributed to Gibbons.112  Indeed, the lines from the notes dovetail with this
statement in Corfield:
Paving stones, sand, and many other things, are as clearly articles of trade as
oysters; but can it be contended, that the laws of a state, which treat as tort
feasors those who shall take them away without the permission of the owner
of them, are commercial regulations?113
And he probably thought that the state statute was valid even if the com-
merce power was exclusive, as he was familiar with that claim from the Wol-
cott veto but made no distinction on that basis in his notes.  If Gibbons was
not the cause of Justice Washington’s about-face in Corfield, then what was?
C. The Content of the Journal—Privileges and Immunities
The answer to the mysterious switch in Corfield is hiding in plain sight
within the Corfield notes.  When the Justice turned his attention to the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause claim, he scribbled the following:
As to [Article IV, Section 2] of the Constitution, “the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all privileges [and] immunities of citizens in the several
States.”  Is the right which a citizen has to enjoy the common property
belonging to the citizens of the State a privilege or immunity? See infra A[.]
. . . .
A[.]  I am inclined to think that it is a privilege within the meaning of this
article of the Constitution.  If it be not, then the rights to navigate the waters
would not be, because they also are common property, and yet it would look
to violate this article to make a law forbidding citizens of other states to
navigate the waters of that State.  I am inclined to the opinion of the [court]
in Livingston v. Van Ingen, that the meaning of this article is that the citizens
of each State shall within every other State have equal privileges or rights as
the citizens of such State have[,] the words all privileges of citizens being
equivalent to equal privileges.114
The surprise here is that Justice Washington initially believed that the New
Jersey statute did violate the Constitution.  This probably explains why he
asked the jury to find for the plaintiff at trial.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. Gibbons did make a brief reference to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause in stating that the Constitution “only protects the per-
sonal rights of the citizens of one State, when within the jurisdiction of another, by secur-
ing to them ‘all the privileges and immunities of a citizen’ of that other, which they hold
subject to the laws of the State as its own citizens.” Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 69.
Justice Washington quoted Gibbons in the Commerce Clause portion of Corfield but did not
do so in the privileges-and-immunities portion, thus it is hard to know what he thought
about this line or whether his consideration of Corfield shaped the statement.
113 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230).
114 Washington Notebook, supra note 1.  The Justice also wrote that a “[p]rivilege in
law is some peculiar benefit granted to certain persons or places contrary to the usual
course of the law.  Immunity is an exemption from some official duty or imposition.” Id.
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While there is no indication of why the Justice changed his stance,115 his
tentative reasoning was clear enough.  Washington took for granted that one
of the privileges and immunities of citizens was the use of navigable waters in
any state.116  With that premise, he could not see how the right to harvest
oysters from those waters could be distinguished.  In the Corfield opinion, the
Justice appeared to answer his own question by stating that a citizen’s right
“to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agri-
culture, professional pursuits, or otherwise,” which included using navigable
waters for travel, was not analogous to the right to fish in those waters.117
More broadly, Justice Washington’s view that Corfield was a close case on the
privileges-and-immunities question could explain why he felt the need to dis-
cuss those liberties in dicta before coming down on the side that oyster har-
vesting was not among them.  Put another way, the view that Corfield’s
privileges-and-immunities dicta was unnecessary rests in part on an assump-
tion that the conclusion was clear-cut, but the notes demonstrate that this was
not how Justice Washington saw the case.
A second point about this section of the notes is that they state the
source that Justice Washington relied on for his privileges-and-immunities
analysis. Livingston was the New York decision that upheld the steamboat law
invalidated by Gibbons.118  On the Privileges and Immunities Clause, one of
the seriatim opinions in Livingston declared that “[t]he constitution of the
United States intends that the same immunities and privileges shall be
extended to all the citizens equally, for the wise purpose of preventing local
jealousies, which discriminations (always deemed odious) might otherwise
produce.”119  Chancellor Kent’s separate opinion was even more emphatic:
The provision that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several states, has nothing to do with
this case.  It means only that citizens of other states shall have equal rights
with our own citizens, and not that they shall have different or greater
rights.120
In endorsing these views, Justice Washington’s notes say that, at least
initially, he viewed the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a rule of equal
treatment and not as a guarantee of fundamental rights.  This means that he
115 The section of the notes following this paragraph contains another summary of the
cases (some English) that were probably raised by counsel. See id.
116 Even the abbreviated list of national privileges or immunities in Slaughter-House
included the right to use navigable waterways. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
117 See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.  One explanation for this distinction given what Justice
Washington said in his Corfield opinion is that the use of navigable waters for transporta-
tion cannot be exhausted in the way that a fishery can. See id.
118 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812).  The Justice took notes on Living-
ston later in the Corfield section of his journal, but he focused on its discussion of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause instead of on its analysis of the Commerce Clause. See
Washington Notebook, supra note 1.
119 Livingston, 9 Johns. at 561 (opinion of Yates, J.).
120 Id. at 577 (opinion of Kent, C.J.).
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probably was not advancing the broader interpretation given to Corfield by
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress.121  In a sense, this fact is irrelevant.
Judicial opinions are capable of growth in the common-law tradition and are
not read in an originalist sense, as a statute or a constitutional provision may
be.  Moreover, Justice Washington might have changed his mind (just as he
did on the validity of the New Jersey law)122 and written the privileges-and-
immunities dicta as he did to support a fundamental-rights view.  In another
sense, however, the notes give Corfield’s dicta an entirely new spin in “the
court of history.” 123
Accordingly, the Corfield notes contain details that challenge the
received wisdom about that case and about Gibbons.  The discovery of the
notes proves the adage that “I’d rather be lucky than good,” but hopefully my
luck will redound to the benefit to other scholars who now know about and
can consult Bushrod Washington’s lost journal.
III. DESIGNING THE RIGHT TO VOTE
This Part goes beyond the Corfield notes to consider the enduring signifi-
cance of Justice Washington’s opinion.  The eye-opening part of Corfield’s
privileges-and-immunities dicta was its inclusion of “the elective franchise, as
regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is
to be exercised,” among the fundamental rights.124  Until well into the twen-
tieth century, Corfield was the only legal authority that called the right to vote
fundamental.  As a result, advocates for women’s suffrage often invoked
Washington’s opinion during Reconstruction.125  Acknowledging Corfield’s
role in the development of voting rights is long overdue, especially given that
its dicta exemplifies the tension created by leaving such a fundamental right
to state regulation.126
A. Searching for an Ideal
To say that voting eligibility in the United States was not universal in
practice comes as no surprise, but what may be startling is the realization that
until fairly recently there were no powerful aspirational statements on the
121 See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 33–41.
123 Cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (stating that Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), “has been overruled in the court of history”).
124 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230).  In fairness,
Corfield said that voting “may be added” to the list of fundamental rights, id., but that
qualification does not undercut the significance of the statement.
125 See infra notes 137–38, 143–46 and accompanying text.
126 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 264 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White &
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (making this observation about
Corfield); cf. WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 216 (Cornell Univ. Press 1966)
(1867) (“The primary element in a free government—the determination [of] how many
people shall have a share in it—in America depends not on the [federal] [g]overnment
but on certain subordinate local, and sometimes, as in the South now, hostile bodies.”).
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right to vote.  None of the Framers proclaimed that all citizens had an inher-
ent right to vote, and they proposed a Constitution that left suffrage regula-
tion entirely to the states.127  A careful search through the rhetoric of the
legal and political heavyweights during the nineteenth and much of the twen-
tieth century comes up empty in finding stirring statements about the right
to vote as fundamental.128  Only in the 1960s did that ideal emerge in
Supreme Court opinions and in public speeches, such as President Lyndon
B. Johnson’s address to the nation after the violence in Selma.129
While longstanding resistance to voting for women, African Americans,
and the poor helps explain the absence of suffrage from the rights consid-
ered self-evident or vital, a conceptual vacuum was also to blame.  Voting
could not be understood as a natural right that existed in a society without
government or as a common-law right that was backed by custom or tradi-
tion.  Treating voting as a fundamental right requires some theory of the
representation necessary in a constitutional democracy.  And that sort of the-
ory took a long time to work itself pure. Corfield was the first case to antici-
pate that development, if only in passing.130
The voting-rights language in Corfield lay dormant until the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, when the power of Justice Washington’s statement bent the text of
127 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 354 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(justifying the Convention’s decision to leave suffrage qualifications to the states).
Bushrod Washington could be understood as a Framer given that he voted for the Consti-
tution’s ratification in Virginia, see CASPER, supra note 82, at 10, but I daresay that most
people do not think of delegates to the state ratifying conventions as being among the
Framers.
128 The closest example is from Yick Wo v. Hopkins, where the Supreme Court described
voting as “not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by
society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fun-
damental political right, because preservative of all rights.”  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886).  A decade later, however, the Court affirmed that a woman was a United
States citizen “although not entitled to vote, the right to the elective franchise not being
essential to citizenship.”  United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 680 (1898).
129 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“[W]ealth or fee paying
has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned.”); Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to
the Congress: The American Promise (Mar. 15, 1965), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965, at 281, 282 (1966) (“The most
basic right of all was the right to choose your own leaders.  The history of this country, in
large measure, is the history of the expansion of that right to all of our people. . . . Every
American citizen must have an equal right to vote.”).  Article 21 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights marked the start of the modern trend in stating: “The will of the
people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948).
130 New Jersey gave women the right to vote until 1807. See KEYSSAR, supra note 64, at
54.  As Corfield was about a New Jersey statute, one wonders if Washington thought about
that fact in making an aspirational statement about voting as a privilege and immunity of
citizenship.
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the Fourteenth Amendment itself.  In discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
Senator Trumbull said that in Corfield:
Th[e] judge goes further than the bill under consideration, and he lays
it down as his opinion that under this clause of the Constitution, securing to
the citizen of each State all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States of the United States, a person who is a citizen in one State and
goes to another is even entitled to the elective franchise . . . .131
Opponents of the Civil Rights Act, realizing that African American male vot-
ing was politically unpopular, seized upon Corfield as proof that the Act would
give many of the freed slaves voting rights even though voting was not listed
in the statute.  As Congressman Andrew Rogers of New Jersey said:
This bill, then, would prevent a State from refusing negro suffrage under the
broad acceptation of the term “civil rights or immunities.”  In fact, it has
been decided by the circuit court of the United States, in the case of
Corfield vs. Coryell . . . that the elective franchise is included in the words
privileges and immunities.132
B. The Fourteenth Amendment and Women’s Suffrage
In response, the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted to make clear that
the guarantee of “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” did not
cover the suffrage right listed in Corfield.133  First, Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment spelled out in detail how voting rights were to be addressed with
the word “male” inserted into the final text to indicate that women did not
have a constitutional right to vote.134  Second, the wording of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause is not identical to the wording of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.  Why are they different?  One possibility is that this
change was meant to disassociate the Fourteenth Amendment from Justice
Washington’s interpretation of the older provision, either in toto or just with
respect to voting rights.  There is no direct evidence for this interpretation,
131 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
132 Id. at 1122 (statement of Rep. Rogers).
133 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  In his introductory speech, Senator Howard
explained: “The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus
secured by the Constitution.  It is merely the creature of law.  It has always been regarded
in this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental
rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except as
slaves, subject to a depotism [sic].” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (state-
ment of Sen. Howard).  Howard did not attempt to reconcile this view with his quotation
of the Corfield dicta earlier in the same speech. See id. at 2765.
134 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (defining the potential voter pool as “any of the
male inhabitants” of a state “being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States” excepting those who participated “in rebellion, or other crime”).  For more on
Section 2, see Gerard N. Magliocca, Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 774, 783–90 (2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL204.txt unknown Seq: 23  7-JAN-20 14:46
2019] rediscovering C O R F I E L D V. C O R Y E L L 723
but the strong aversion in 1866 to extending universal male suffrage offers
contextual support for that reading.135
Nevertheless, friends of women’s suffrage continued citing Corfield for
the proposition that, as citizens, women were entitled to vote.  In 1871, Victo-
ria Woodhull petitioned the House of Representatives and claimed that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gave women
a suffrage right.136  Albert Riddle, Woodhull’s attorney, told the National
Women’s Suffrage Convention that her petition was backed by Corfield and
observed that “Bushrod Washington, the favorite nephew of our Washington,
made the decision, ladies.  He was the Washington who got all of the brains
of the family outside of its great chief; and he put them to a most admirable
use.”137  Riddle further argued that Chancellor Kent’s quotation of Corfield’s
line on the “elective franchise” in his famed treatise amounted to a “canoni-
zation” of the decision on that point.138
The House Judiciary Committee, in an opinion by John Bingham,
rejected the Woodhull Memorial while quoting from Corfield.139  Bingham
was the drafter of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and reasoned that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not give women the right to vote in part because
Section 2 of the Amendment made clear that only men were presumptively
eligible voters.140  Prior to giving that explanation, though, Bingham repro-
duced all of Corfield’s dicta on the privileges and immunities of citizens with-
out comment.141  One inference that can be drawn is that he was saying that
Corfield’s comment that voting rights were subject to state regulation meant
that states could prohibit women from voting.
135 The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, brought the nation closer to universal
male suffrage by barring racial discrimination in voting. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
136 See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 59, at 159–60; see also Victoria C. Woodhull, Address to
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives (Jan. 11, 1871), in 2 HISTORY OF
WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 8, at 444, 444–48.
137 Riddle, supra note 8, at 453; see LASH, supra note 5, at 235 (describing the speech).
Riddle repeated this argument in a losing effort to invalidate the District of Columbia’s bar
on women voting. See id. at 235 n.13.
138 See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 35–36 (New York, William Kent
8th ed. 1854) (1827); Riddle, supra note 8, at 453.
139 See Woman Suffrage, supra note 16, at 1 (reproducing the House Judiciary Committee
Report).  The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion three years later, see Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 162 (1875), though the Court did not refer to Corfield
in its opinion.  The plaintiff in Minor who was challenging the exclusion of women from
voting in Missouri did cite the Corfield dicta. See Virginia L. Minor’s Petition in the Circuit
Court of St. Louis County, December Term, 1872, reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUF-
FRAGE, supra note 8, at 715, 725–26.
140 See Woman Suffrage, supra note 16, at 1; see also MAGLIOCCA, supra note 59, at 108,
112–19, 121–23 (describing Bingham’s drafting of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
141 See Woman Suffrage, supra note 16, at 1.
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At least that was the inference drawn by the two dissenting members of
the House Judiciary Committee, who issued their own opinion.142  After
quoting from Corfield’s dicta, the dissent stated: “This case is cited by the
majority of the Committee, as sustaining their view of the law, but we are
unable so to understand it.  It is for them an exceedingly unfortunate cita-
tion.”143  In Corfield,
the court enumerated some of the “privileges of citizens,” such as are “in
their nature fundamental and belong of right to the citizens of all free governments”
(mark the language), and among those rights, place the “right of the elec-
tive franchise” in the same category with those great rights of life, liberty, and
property.  And yet the Committee cite this case to show that this right is not a
fundamental right of the citizen!144
The dissent conceded that Corfield explained that suffrage “is to be enjoyed as
regulated and established by the State in which it is to be exercised,” but
rejected the argument that “[t]hese words are supposed to qualify the right,
or rather take it out of the list of fundamental rights, where the Court had
just placed it.”145  A right was either fundamental or was not; Corfield could
not be read to say that something is
a “fundamental right of the citizen,” but it does not exist, unless the laws of
the State give it.  A singular species of “fundamental rights!”  Is there not a
clear distinction between the regulation of a right and its destruction?  The
State may regulate the right, but it may not destroy it.146
The House Judiciary Committee dissent restated the problem with vot-
ing rights that Corfield had recognized fifty years earlier.  Suffrage is a funda-
mental right, but the regulation of that right remains principally with the
states.  The constitutional amendments that bar states from engaging in par-
ticular types of voting discrimination have narrowed but not eliminated that
gap.  Voting rights remain dependent on state and local governments
because they control the drawing of district boundaries, the allocation of
presidential electors, whether ex-felons are eligible to vote, the counting of
disputed ballots, and the implementation of election procedures.147  What,
142 See WILLIAM LOUGHRIDGE & BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, MINORITY REPORT OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE WOODHULL MEMORIAL H.R. REP. NO.
41-5, pt. 2 (1871) [hereinafter LOUGHRIDGE & BUTLER], reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN
SUFFRAGE, supra note 8, at 464, 464–82.  One of the dissenters, Representative Benjamin
Butler, was Bingham’s nemesis in the House of Representatives during Reconstruction. See
MAGLIOCCA, supra note 59, at 104–06 (discussing their rivalry).
143 See LOUGHRIDGE & BUTLER, supra note 142, at 470.
144 Id. at 470–71 (emphasis added).
145 Id. at 471 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146 Id.  But cf. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2054 (1868) (statement of Rep.
Woodward) (citing Corfield for the proposition that “suffrage is one of the reserved rights
of the States and that the Federal Government has no power to confer or take it away”).
147 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legisla-
ture thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regula-
tions . . . .”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
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then, does calling voting a fundamental right mean when states are given
significant latitude in enforcement?  We still struggle with the paradox that
Corfield identified in cases involving the validity of aspects of the Voting
Rights Act or state photo identification requirements for voting.148
As a postscript, consider how the Supreme Court read Corfield’s voting
dicta.  Until 1898, the Court shunned the “elective franchise” phrase when
quoting the rest of Corfield’s privileges-and-immunities language.149  Two
years later, voters in St. Louis brought an equal protection challenge against
a voter registration statute in Missouri that singled out the city’s voters for
special treatment.150  The Justices unanimously rejected this claim and
stated: “[T]he elective franchise, if one of the fundamental privileges and
immunities of the citizens of St. Louis, as citizens of Missouri and of the
United States, is clearly such franchise ‘as regulated and established by the
laws or Constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised.’”151  The
quoted language, of course, came from Corfield.
Accordingly, Justice Washington’s statement that voting was a fundamen-
tal right of citizens was the first step on the long road toward recognizing that
right as part of our constitutional heritage.  Why or how he had this epiphany
remains a mystery, as in this instance he decided not to record his thinking in
the Corfield notes.
CONCLUSION
Corfield v. Coryell is constitutional law’s greatest fossil.  Justice Bushrod
Washington’s dicta on the privileges and immunities of citizens is a fragment
that provides tantalizing clues on our unwritten rights, which remains a sig-
nificant concern for the twenty-first century. Corfield’s dicta was then
exhumed following the Civil War and put on display during the debates on
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and on the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that
many believe is still relevant for interpreting those rights.  If only judges and
scholars knew more about this relic.
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Sena-
tors and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”); Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926–29 (2018) (discussing the history of constitutional chal-
lenges to partisan gerrymandering by states); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 25
(1974) (upholding state authority to disenfranchise ex-felons).  Though Congress has the
power under Article I to draw congressional district boundaries and to resolve disputed
elections to that body, in practice these matters are now left to the states.
148 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Crawford v. Marion Cty. Elec-
tion Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
149 See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 248–49 (1898) (quoting for the first time all of
the privileges-and-immunities dicta in Corfield).  For example, none of the opinions in
Slaughter-House included Corfield’s voting-rights language. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75–76 (1873); id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 117 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting); see also Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 183 (1878) (citing Corfield but without
the voting-rights language); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395 (1877) (same).
150 See Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 328–330 (1900).
151 Id. at 335 (quoting Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. at 249) (citing Corfield).
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This Article supplies some context for Corfield with the help of Justice
Washington’s rough notes on the cases.  While these notes do not answer all
of the outstanding questions about his ruling or definitely resolve what the
dicta should mean now, they do shed important light about Corfield and on
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.  It is my hope that other
scholars will benefit from examining this new piece of the historical record.
